Introduction
In countrieswhicb. have some influence over world agricultural prices, policymakers need to cantHer how other r."ountries may react to a change in trade policy, and the time profile of the effects of the policy. Wbere more than one country can influence prices, tbt.re is potential for conflict. Such situations can be analysed with game theory. Where the efFe.~to of a poliey are not insta.nta..1!lI!-· nil, or if there nre production lags or other adjustment CO~tRt Ii dynamic model is suitable. If the commodity in question is stored. changes in 6tock levels must also be considered. In this pDf.;2r the strategic, intertemporal and stoekholding aspects of trade policy determinatioll are jointly considered in a dynamic game model with competitive storage. This paper is an extension of earlier work on strategic trade policy in the abs<:nce of stl')rage. In Vanletti and Kennedy (1988a) , tbe ntrategic effects O'fpolicy were anoAlysed in astatic framework. It was assumed that traders expected nO' retaliation from tlleir rivals, although some response could be readily observed. The effects of a trade wr.u-O'n prices, tariffs and welfare distributioll \VOle assessed. Retaliatory be.haviour wa. q shown to be self-limiting. at least if traders were setting tariffs or taxes so as to maximIse welfare. To explain the observed pattern of trade flows and prices, weights O'n the !7 urplus attributed to producers and consumers-taxpayers Wi(!re estimated. In Vanzetti and Kennedy (1988b) , domestir prk'li>1J were differentiated, and weights were estimated fo1' t.hree groups (with consume-IS and taxpayers treated separately). In a later paper (Vanzetti and Kennedy 1988c) , the assumption that rivals were expected not to retaliate was dropped. This modified t'~e mDst appropriate j)olicy, and led to different tradf': war outcomes.
rJl,'\e il~d (.',.,r a dynamic model results from the lags in pr Jduction and policy response. 1-if"11' $I)::t ~.ir ..utural crops there is lliag between the decisAon to produce and the harvest. Fuji th . . . ,rroore. price expectations may be based on past prices. Likewise, policymt..kers m.ey be . . . . 'n"t,l'ained respQudirtatant,n.eously to ehanges inrivah' trade policies. Dynamic models. aliowfor intertemporal .r.olllbinationa of beha\iourthat cannot be carJtured ip,astatic model. A dynamicgawe model wuprelented in VanzetU and Kenr!edy (1988d.) . Tht': !effects. on pric~J: t~iffr.and welfare of changes in ,tbe perceived timeltoruon •. thediscQunt rate and an Americ:tUl drought 'werecomideredOc In Vanzetti(1988) , welfare weights were e$timated using mO"e recent data, and the dynamic trade Wat' &olutions were estiro~ted assuming that tra!lers were .maximising weightedwetrarefunctions.
The J1lQdelsdetcribed thus far do not indude storage. The rationale for etorage in a deterministi~ .model resl1~tsn()t from stochastic shocks, but from the price variation induced by the tariffs. Given fluctuating prices, it is reasonable that private,competiti'V'e storage would play some role .in smoothing out those price fiuctllations. Judas consumers and producers n:spond to price changes, so would stockholders, in an effort to maximise their sp~cul~tive gam •.
The purpoae of this paper is to incorporate storage into a dynamic game model. or interest is the efFect uf storage on domestic and world price levels and stability. Does the opportunity to store alter trade barriers, and lead to a sIDIJothing of world and domestic pricefiuctuations? How is market power affected by the hQldingof stocks, and given this, what i. the importance of storage costs in determining which countries hold stocks?
In previous papers, the dynamic game model involved the use of dynamic programming to provide an analytic solution for the optimal set of tt.riffs over time. Riccati equations were used to update the welfare matrix each period. The advantage of this procedure is that the so-called 'curse of dimensionality' is overcome. There ~s no practical constraint on the number of time periods or regions that can be included in the model. A limitation of this procedure is that it requires that the state transl0rmation equations be equalities. H stocks are to be included in the model, it is necessary that they not fall below zero 1 • Thus, a different approach is necessary. In this paper, a multtperiod, quadratic programming trade model is presented. This is used to find the welfare maximising levels of tariffs, stocks, production, consumption and price for each country, for any given level of tariffs and stocks in other countries. An iteral.1Ve procedure is then used to find the game-theoretic Cournot-Nuh equilibrium.
In the next section, the stockholding literature as it applies to trade is examined. The QP model is described in Sec don 3, and applied to the intern~tional wheat market in Section 4. hnplications and conclusions are presented in the filiAl section.
Storage and Trade
In this section the role of storage in stabilising prices and increasing welfare is reviewed.
Stabilisation is then related to the international market, where instability may be induced (or indeed, reduced) by trade policies, as well M by stochastic shocks. Finally, the relationship between storage and market power is assessed. Studies which examine these areas are reviewed.
The welfare effect. of stabilisati( n are well known. Massell (1969) showed that with ''''iT~ ~-;dre~e:;l 'ii~ores the possibility of using futures market "I to sell a crop that has not yet been produced. lbl,ear$upplyapdd.emand cutve~ andstocltastic, additive shirt teJ;m$, complete price .
• tabUilatiol); leadJ tOlill in.crease in the ~ected value of welflU"e. M8$seU synthesised the wodtQrW~ugh (1944) . who cQncluded that ·consumers gain from unstable supply, and Ol(1961) ,who deduced that producers gainf'rom instability caused by shifts in demand.
Gahts . . eanbe'ntade, it appeared, by generCLting instability,a counter"intuitive result indeed. MtilSellshQwedthat'b.ootatrapping' in Hazell and Anderson (1984) , th&t much of the gains from stabilisation could be attributed to the removal of forecasting errors, becaUJe. the cost of instability varies directly with producers' price forecasts. More accurate forecasts would remove much of the need for stabilisation by means of stockholding (Scandiazo, p. 77). Now consider price stabilisation in international trade. It follows from the work of Oi that exporters gain and importers lose from perfect stabilisation when supply is unstable (assuming linear supply and demand schedules and additive disturbances). C"nverlie1Yt exporters lose and importers gain from stabillSlation when demand fluctuations are the source of instability. Regardless of the source, the net effect of stabilisation is a global increase in welfare.
Of course, variations in prices can be accommodated not only by a change in stocks t but also by a change in trade. A given domestic price inCl'ease can be avvided by a reduction in stocks or an increase in imports. Trade policies affect trade flows, so what is the relationship between stocks and trade policy! An importer can reduce tariffs in times of shortage, thus increasing imports and reducing the need to rely on stocks. Shce a given shortage can be met by changes in tariffs or stocks, any tariff can be expressed in tenns of an inventory equivalent. Grennes, Johnson and Thursby (1978) Bigman (1985) has demonstated the effectivem::s of free trade compared to other stabilisation policies (such as buffer stocks, minium price suppa,,'t, government procurement and guaranteed income). The stabilising effect of an open economy cunsiderably reduces both the need for and cost of various stabilsatioI: prvgrams. Of course, the \"elativp effectiveness of stocks and free trade depend upon the supply and demand pa.'rameters, the degree of risk aversion, the cost of storagr and other factors. An important ;onsideration is that other countries may insulate their domestic economies, leaving free traders prCJne toVlide' fiuc.tulltioD,$ in price. 'Zwad'and Meilke (1979) Zwart and Meilke also demonstrated that stability could be attained by varying domestic policies to counter mtochastic shocks. However 1 they were not able t'O conclude whether such measute3 are lUore appropriate than buffer stock policies, the result depending upon the particular costs of domestic instability compared to the costs of financing the buffer stocks. Shei and Thompson (1917) examined the relationship between domestic policies and price stability, utilising a quadratic programming model. They came to the now familiar conclusion that domestic policies, which insulate domestic markets, are the source ofmllch instability in the world mat'ket. Newbery (1984) argued that stabilisation provides larger benefits in the presence of trade distortions than in their absence. First, prices are inherently less stable with distor· tions. However, the type of distortion (tariffs or quotas) significantly affects the possible benefit.s, depending on whether the degree of distortion changes with the variability in price Second, increased stability maY lead to an increase in supply from risk averse producers, resulting in additional benefits.
Newbery addressed the important pOl!' t concerning storage and market power. A monopolist facing a stable linear demand CUI ve will store more than a competitive market with the same average supply. This enables the monopolist to exploit the consumers more t!ffectively (p. 273). However, the monopolist may store less than the competitive amount if the demand curve has a constant elasticity (depending upon the curvature). Consumers can counter this monopoly power by carrying their own stocks, and prices will be no less stahle than in a perfectly competitive environment. Nichols and Zeckhauser (1977) examined stockpiling aimed at suppressing rather than smoothing prices. Consumers build up stocks in early periods to influence a monopolist producer to lower prices in later periods. Here, supply conditions are determined not by chance (that is, stochastic disturbances) but by a producer or producer cartel attempting to maximise profits. In fact, both parties gain from the consumer stockpile, as the countervailing power reduces deadweight efficiency losses. The distribution of the gains depends on the time horizon, with consumers becoming relatively better off as the horizon increases. The outcome of this game depends very much on the assumptions regarding mpply characteristics: somewhat peculiar to depletable resources, but serves to illustrate the l'Oleor.tockholdingin .offsetting market pOWer.
From the liter .. t\ll'e it c.ubeconduded that instability due to stoch8$tic shocks can be modified'bl ~th-er stOtibolding or by free trade. Given the correlation between shocks aaop .. countri~. illow) .free trade appears to be the ntostsuitablemeans or stabilisation.
Ht>wever,IQnY ¢91lntries.h.ve cltoJentl'adepoUcles which insulatetbe domestic markets, thus prevcmting the intenlationaitr&\ding system ftomaccommodating the instability.
A limitation ofthe$e mod~s' (ex<e~pting Nichols and Oonsider an intemationalmarket in which there is no cooperation between policymaken in eadtcountry or region and demand 'Illd s:.tpply turves are linear and deterministic. Tariffs (the domestic-world price differential) #l1'e set so as to maximise a welfare function subject to world price and the tariffs and stocks set by all other countries. The welfare function for each country consists .of the sum of distounted return&. including the costs and speculative profit. from storage, accruing to the different groups over a finite number of years. Furthennore, assume supply is a func:tion of laggedpdces and tariffs, and that the product is homogeneous. These assumptions are discussed in detail in Varu:etti and Kennedy (1988d).
One point which needs elabora.tion is the reason for holding stocks in a deterministic model. AI there is no uncertainty, stockholdi.ng is required only to smooth out price ·Ductu8.tionlJ occurring for other reasons. One such reason is non-random demand shifts, due to autonomous growth in demand. The second reason is changes in world prices due to changes .intariff •.
The model will now be described in detail. The ('xcet' ds the discounted price in the Sellillg period, no stocks will be held. SpeculatorR will continue to store until the profit is driven down to Zeta. Where storage is not cost1~ss, welfate maximise \ion u.,:curs at less then complete stllbilisation. The price change between periods will, however, be no greater than the cost of carrying stock.
In each period, the excess of demand over supply must be equal to imports plus the change in stocks. Across all countries, the market clearing equilibrium condition requires ( 15) where Pi ia an n vector of linear coefficients, 1/1. is an n vector of decision variables, lUld Ki a negative semi-definite nxn matrix of quadratic coefficients. (The off-diagonal terms in K i. are of course the coefficients of the multiplicative terms in the welfare function, and K, is symmetric.)
D1,
The welfare function is maximised subject to the constraints implied by the demand, supply and market clearance equations (1-4). (16) where A is a matrix of constraint coefficients, and b a vector of constraints (in this case, the demand and supply intercept terms, and stock levels). Assuming, for illustrative purposes,
• two region by three period model, the various matrices can be represented as shown.
The vector of constants, bi, sh.OW$ the supply and demand intercept terms. The supply intercept tetllbJ in the first two periods are adjusted to account for lagged prices. Tariffs <-7E;~\;"~ (12) io~ ·P.q;:·~;~me5 '1 exceed. sera, as is the cue for all data used here. If.., is negative, t~e COJllt~t term -..,1./26i it i. not included. Note that it drops out. upon differentiation. 
. Following presentation of the reference data, the optimal solution for the United States in the absence of retaliation is shown. The impact of storage, assuming other countries neither store nor set tariffs, on USA tar.iffs and the world price is examined. To show the effect of the option to store on market power. the Comnot-Nash solution without storage is compared with one in which the USA, the EC and Japan hold stocks.
The data
The quantity data were obtained from Intenu~tlonal Wheat Council statistics, as presented in lAC (1988) . They pertain to the crop year 1985 .. 86, the most recent data available.
1985 .. 86 wu not a representative year, being characterised by high stock levels and significant government intervention. This needs to be borne in mind when interpreting the results. The elasticiti\!s !l.re from Sarris and Freebaim (1983) , and are short-run. It is not possible to obtain empirical estimates for the supply and demand elasticities for the particular aggregation of rest-cf .. world used here. The parameters chosen are reasonable, and moderate variation does not change the results qualitatively.
In this model, the world has been divided into the USA, the EC, Japan and the rest ot the world, a competitive fringe, which does not set tariffs or store grain, but responds to the world price in both production and consumption. The limited number of separate traders in the model refleds the problem of dimensionality . The model is run over 12 period., six of which are reported here, as convergence is achieved within that time 3 • The adjustment coefficient t is -0.3 for all countries for all time periods. This implies a weight of 0.7 on the one period lag and 0.3 on the two period lag. The real discount rate is set at three percent. The cost of stockholding increases with the discount rate. An autonomous growth in demand of three percent per year is assumed (0\' all regions. This implies tha.t storage will occur even if tariffs remain at zero, and thull relative reductions in storage are accommodated . Without growth in demand, there are periods in which tariffs are affected by the constraint that stocks cannot fall below zero. If the discount rate is much higher than the growth rate, stockholding is expensive compared to the world price changes, and few if any stocks are held. With zero growth and a five per cent discount rate, stocks would only be held in the disequilibrium periods between free trade (period zero) and )Note that if' th~ model aolve. in 10 complete ite.ratioDs, 30 separate QP solutions must be calculated.
The c:omplete Cournot-Nuh solution takes .. bouL 70 minutes of cpu time on a Vax 8800. convergence (period 5). Once at the equilibrium, there would be no incentive to hold stocks, as the world price would be stable.
The reference period data is shown in Table 1 . All price are in USS terms. The world price is taken as S128ft, the US Gulf Hard Winter Wheat price.
Impact of stockholding on tariffs in absence of retaliation
In this model. the levels of stocks and tariffs in any given country are simU:taneously determined, as policy n·.akera set tariffs with a knowledge of how stockholders wit: behave, just as they know how produ.cers and consumer$ will behave. However, to asl en t.he impact of storage, it is useful to compare optimal solutions with and without ,jtorage. Export tUIt;"I for the USA, assuming other regions maintain a free trade policy and hold no stocks, are shown graphically in Figure 1 , and in detail in Table 2 . World prices are also shown. Period zero is the free trade solution. Stocks in period zero refer to the carryover from pl.!riod zero to period one. FiGure 1. Impact of Stockholding USA EXDOft reI" n WOtIIJ Price, Welfare without stocks: S19976m, welfare with stocks: S19989rn.
Note firstly tha.t the optimal policy for an exporter, such as the United States, is an export tax. Market power is exercised, .in the absence of stockholding, by applying a tax which lowen the domestic price and raises the world price. (Note, however, that there is an upward trend in price.I) here because of the autonomous growth in demand.) If storage is available, i.t is optimal to bold some stocks to abate lome of the price increase. Average national welfare increaseuby a small margin, dependent upon the growth in demand, the discount tate and the cost of storage.
In this deterministic model optimal stock le~~ls are quite low, much lower than in reality. This illustrates that the need to hold stocks to eliminate price fluctuations due to factors other than stochastic shocks is minimal. In the real world, the USA holds stocks that might otherwise be held by other nation" and furt.hermore, public stockholding reflects p.olides aimed at supporting producer incomes, rather than pure price stabilisation.
Storage does not have a significant effect on the level of optimal tariffs. Taxes are not noticeably different. The demand for grain by stockholders raises the price, regardless of taxes. This can be seen in period zero, where the tax is zero. Thus, prices are .higher in the initial periods, in which stocks are built up, but are similar to prices without storage after three or four periods. One of the major reasons producers are in favour of buffer stock stabilisation schemes is that prices rise in the initial years of establishment of the scheme. This benf:dit often outweighs that due to price stabilisation per se. Wright &fid William! (1984) maintain that this is an important and neglected feature of models of price stabilisation.
The use of stockholdin g in countervaili ng market power
In the previous subsection it was noted that, for an individual country, storage does not appear to have much effect on the main instrument of market power, the export tax. What if other countries or regions can also impose taxes or hold stocks? How will this effect the optimal policies of anyone country? This is determined by calculating the Cournot· Nash solution. The Cournot·Nash taxes for the USA and world prices are shown in Table 3 .
The solutions with and without storage can be compared. The global eff'ectsare best seen in Table 4 ,V(he~e average tatifr,.toek and welfare levels ateshown. The averages for the trade flow and thetarift" exclude' period .zero, the free trade solution. The ECandJapan benefit by .retali~th1g against the USA. These benefits derive mainly, but not entirely. from the trade barrien, rather than the availability of storage. When all interdependencies are taken intoaccou,nt, the option to store does not appear to have a ~at influence on trade bMriers. The average world price i. marginally lower, reflecting the influence of the lower EO export tax. Total tv~de is higher, and the USA has increased its market share. Japan has lowered its tariff, and increased its imports. As a cOtlSuming nation, it has benefited most from the storage that occurs in the rest of the world.
The location of storage. across regions is primarily dependent uponre1ative costs of storage. For the results presented in Table 4 , costs. are assumed the sarne in earh country and there are no transport costs. Thus storage in each region depends upon that region's ability to influence world prices, that is, its market power. The availability of storage in the EO and Japan has had little effect on world prices compared to a situation in which the world's stocks are held in the USA.
The welfare gains are sensitive to storage costs. In a separate analysis, not shown here, the storage cost for the EC was raised from $5 to '1 per tonne. USA stocks averaged 1.45, up from 1.14 mmt. EC stocks fell to .55 nom 1.51 mmt, and Japanese stocks fell from . National welfare in the USA rose slightly to S19438m, and fell in the EC and Japan to '22784Inand S1301mrespectively. This illustrates that storage costs in one country dearly in:fiuence welfare in others, through the effect on world price. The stockholding function is only partially transferred to a low cost country, the USA in this. instance, because this country has the. market power to extract greater benefits from stockholding than Japan. Where there are many conswning countries, the benefits of a reduction in world price from stockholding are dissipated.
The major results from the empirical analysis are as follows. First, optimal storage levels are very low, much lower than is observed in a stoch'lStic world where public as well as private stocks are held. Second, storage doeln't have a great affect on optimal tax levels. Third, when other countries can set tariffs and store, optimal USA taxes and world prices are relatively unchanged, but the optimal amount of storage declines significantly.
Implications and Conclusions
Before drawing implications from the results, it is prudent to note some limitations of the model. These include the linearity of the supply and demand functions, the validity of the elasticities, and the partial nature of the model, with no cross-commodity or intersectoral effects. The model can best be seen as illustrative of the usefulness of the technique. Wright and Williams (1984) noted the importance of the degree of curvature of the demand curve as a o"terminant of the distribution of the gains from stabilisation. What can be inferred about nonlinear models from the analysis presented here? Unfortunately, little can be said about the Cournot-Nash solution, because nonlinearities may lead to the pOSlsibility of multiple solutions. In the no retaliation case, the single controller problem, the need for stocks to reduce prices after a production . hortfan is reduced as the curvature is increased. This implies that the linear model overestimates the stocks held and the welfare gains from stockholding. Potential b(mefits ean. be, gained by cooperation with other traders on the. 1San:te side of the market, th8~ iS t a coalition ofiInporters, or exporters. However, coalitions are difficult tu nuintain, .&,$ members have a constant incentive to ~cheat' to obtain a greater share of the benefits of collluion. Means of deterrence, detection and enforcement are important considerations . in cooperative agreements. If such problems can be overcome, significant gains can be mt,t,de by exploiting the in«el;lSe in market power that comes with size. This snggests that that Australia might benefit from cooperating with other exporters, such as Canada and Argentina, to force up the world price. Taxes, rather than ,tocks, would be the moat effective policy.
In this analysis storage is based on welfare optimisation, rather than on some trigger mechanism, u is common in many stockholding models. With positive storage costs or discQnnting, it is not desirable to stabilise prices perfectly. However, welfare levels ~e superior to those obtained from the implementatio n of storage band 1'1lles. This conclusion is, of course, dependent on the 3ssumptions of risk neutrality and the policymakers' indifference between !urplus going to the various groups.
What are the implications for public storage? Under the competitive storage assumptions employed here, there is no role for public stockPolding, or, for example, .imposition of a subsidy or tax on private stockholders. Publics," 'rag~ would exactly offset private storage, and would only be useful jf private storage was ~onstrained by limited capacity.
A number of useful refinements could be made to the model presented here. The introduction of stochastic supply and demand disturbances, a multicommod ity framework and a longer lag structure could extend the usefulness of the model. Utility functions, with ritk preferences, could replace the welfare functions employed here. Ideally, income effects should also be accounted for in the welfare functions. Such refinements are beyond the scope of present research, but may be attempted at a later date.
Perhaps the most interesting extension would involve relaxing the assumption of non~ cooperative behaviour. Coalitions of importers or exporters could be analysed, with the possibility of side-payments to discourage cheating on agreements. As a traders could be modelled .in a leader-follower (Stackelberg) framework. This may be particularly applicable on the supply side, with the USA as leader. Such models may more accurately reflect the current nature of the international wheat market.
Where international conunodity markets are characterised by the used of market power and lags in production or policy responses, dynamic games provide a useful means of analysis. In this paper, a dynamic game model incorporating competitive storage has been developed. Stock levels and trade taxes are determined simultaneously . The results suggest that this is a significant ,tep in providing more realistic strategic trade models.
